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Abstract—As market wearables are becoming popular with
a range of services, including making financial transactions,
accessing cars, etc. that they provide based on various private
information of a user, security of this information is becoming
very important. However, users are often flooded with PINs and
passwords in this internet of things (IoT) world. Additionally,
hard-biometric, such as facial or finger recognition, based au-
thentications are not adaptable for market wearables due to
their limited sensing and computation capabilities. Therefore,
it is a time demand to develop a burden-free implicit au-
thentication mechanism for wearables using the less-informative
soft-biometric data that are easily obtainable from the market
wearables. In this work, we present a context-dependent soft-
biometric-based wearable authentication system utilizing the
heart rate, gait, and breathing audio signals. From our detailed
analysis, we find that a binary support vector machine (SVM)
with radial basis function (RBF) kernel can achieve an average
accuracy of 0.94± 0.07, F1 score of 0.93± 0.08, an equal error
rate (EER) of about 0.06 at a lower confidence threshold of 0.52,
which shows the promise of this work.
Index Terms—wearable authentication, biometrics, implicit
authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The interconnected nature of Internet of Things (IoT)
have allowed us to remotely collect information or control
multitude of physical objects. Along with the growth of
IoT, advancements in smartphones and wearables in their
sensing and computational capabilities to a point which enable
many new applications and usage scenarios to emerge [1]–
[5]. Even with this progress, wearables are still growing in
popularity with the arrival of new applications. Some include
the ability to identify a user to third party services [6], protect
commercial customer information (i.e., passwords, credit card
information) [7], manage financial payments, allows access
to smartphones and other paired devices, unlock vehicles [7],
monitor or track individuals (e.g., child or elderly monitoring
or fall detection), and assess an individual’s health and fitness.
According to a recent market report, a 72.7% increase in
wearable shipments and an associated increase in sales revenue
of 78.1% are predicted from 2016 to 2022 [8].
However, wearables also raise new challenges, especially in
terms of security. The main accuracy and reliability concern is
that imposters with unauthorized access can steal information
from other sensitive IoT objects, which poses a significant
risk [9]. Furthermore, an intentional device sharing between
target and non-target users might lead to inaccurate and faulty
assessment since healthcare providers and researchers are
increasingly relying on wearables to monitor their patients or
study participants remotely. Therefore, there is an imperative
need for a robust and accurate authentication mechanism
specifically for wearable device users.
Existing wearable devices either have no authentication sys-
tems or authentication mechanisms that are often knowledge-
based regular PIN locks or pattern locks [7] [10], which
suffer from scalability issues [11]. Additionally, many times,
users opt to completely disable security mechanisms out of
convenience, as the design hinders the implementation of
security itself.
B. Related Work
1) Wearable Constraints: Wearable device user authentica-
tion is a relatively new field of research compared to other
mobile authentication [6], [11]–[13]. The limited display sizes
of wearables add another constraint that limits the choices
of authentication mechanisms [6], [14]. But as technology
advances companies such as Samsung, Fit-bit, Apple, Garmin,
and Embrace can provide lower level granularity in data.
More biometrics are available as more sensors are being
added such as microphone, electrocardiograms (ECG), and
GPS but there still hold accuracy concerns. Researchers have
found that, although for people over the age of 85 Apple
accurately detects atrial fibrillation at a rate of 96%, for
people under 55 it only correctly diagnoses atrial fibrillation
19.6% of the time [15]. Another group of researchers [16]
developed designed wrist strapped ECG reader and developed
an authentication system with an accuracy of 93.5%, which is
limited by the ease of use and the need for user movement.
Therefore, an authentication scheme that can utilize data from
a multitude of readily available sensors on market wearables
could be more realistic to develop a non-stop implicit wearable
device user authentication system.
2) Multi-modal Biometric Authentication: In previous
work, combinations of biometrics were used to form multi-
modal biometric authentication systems for increased reliabil-
ity compared to unimodal systems, which often suffer from
noisy data, intra-class variations, inter-class similarities, and
spoof attacks [17]. For multi-modal authentication systems,
researchers have utilized different hard- and soft-biometrics.978-1-7281-4490-0/20/$31.00 © 2020 IEEE
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However, due to relatively low computational power of
wearables, these multi-modal approaches are typically not
implemented for implicit and continuous authentication on
state-of-the-art wearables.
3) Wearable Authentication: Researchers recently proposed
authentication techniques that are more suitable for wearables,
focusing more on approaches based on behavioral biometrics,
such as gait [18]–[20], activity types [6], [9], gesture [21],
keystroke dynamics [22] and physiological biometrics, such
as PPG signals [23]. Almost all of these studies are based on
project specific generated datasets. While other projects have
addressed some of the limitations of gait-based approaches by
considering different types of gestures [21] or activities [6],
[9]. All of these models are based on movement and thereby,
fail to work in the very common human state of being seden-
tary [14], [22]. Authentication approaches using physiological
biometric data, such as heart rate and bioimpedance [13]
require fine-grained samples and sensor readings are easily
affected by noise, motion, etc but are constantly available.
Depending on a user’s context, i.e., phsysical state and avail-
ability of biometrics it is possible to build a robust multi-modal
authentication process, which is able to continue changing
contexts.
C. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is the exploration of
a hierarchical non-stop implicit authentication for wearables
using less informative coarse-grained soft-biometrics. Com-
pared to previous work [14], [24], where we use hybrid-
biometrics, such as calorie burn that can be affected by a
user’s self-reported input, e.g., age, height, and weight, in
this work we focus on three different soft-biometrics, i.e.,
heart rate, gait, and breathing that can be measured without a
user’s self-reported input and can be easily obtained from the
market wearables. In this work, we present a multi-biometric-
based hierarchical context-driven approach (discussed in Sec-
tion II-E) that works both in sedentary and non-sedentary
periods. We develop both binary and unary models based
on the availability of other people’s data in addition to a
valid user’s data. We are able to authenticate a user with an
average accuracy of 0.82 ± 0.08 & F1 = 0.81 ± 0.08 (non-
sedentary, Table II) and an average accuracy 0.94 ± 0.07 &
F1 = 0.93 ± 0.08 (sedentary, Table III), while developing
the binary SVM models (Section III-D). While developing the
unary models, we obtain an average accuracy of 0.72 ± 0.07
and F1 = 0.73± 0.06 (Sections III-D).
II. APPROACH
In this paper, we intend to demonstrate the importance and
effectiveness of different biometrics to identify wearable de-
vice users with the help of different machine learning models.
Before we describe the detailed analysis, we first introduce
the datasets, pre-processing steps, feature engineering, and
methods used in this work.
A. Datasets
In this work, we use the following three different datasets.
• Fitbit dataset: We use the heart rate data collected at a
rate of one sample per minute using the Fitbit Charge HR
device from 10 subjects similar to our previous work [14],
[24]–[32], [32]–[38].
• Gait dataset: We use the WISDM dataset [39], where
gyroscope and accelerometer readings were collected at
a rate of one sample in 50 milliseconds using the LG G
Watch (running Wear 1.5 operating system). In this work,
we use 10 subjects’ data.
• Audio dataset: We collect breathing audio clips from 10
subjects with six distinct inhalation breathing events per
clip using the Evistr digital voice recorder. The clips are
around 5 seconds long.
B. Data Pre-Processing
Since we are using a real-world datasets, we first need to
clean the dataset before using it. Then, we need to segment
the continuous stream of biometrics, such as heart rate, gait
information, and desired audio events (i.e., breathing). Finally,
we compute and select influential features before constructing
authentication models.
1) Data Segmentation: Since heart rate and gait data were
sampled at different frequencies, therefore, we segment the
heart rate and gait samples into 10-sample windows obtain
stable and rich information. Using a 50% sliding window, we
obtain 800 heart rate windows and 720 gait windows, i.e.,
instances from each subject. Unlike the heart rate or gait data,
the audio data comes with other types of sounds in addition
to desired breathing sounds. Additionally, some clips come
with multiple breathing events separated by silence or noisy
parts. Therefore, we segment the audio clips to fetch single
inhalation breathing events. Thereby, we obtain around six
inhalation breathing events per subject. Each event is modified
in 102 ways mentioned in the next section (Section II-B2),
we obtain a total of 612 instances from each subject. While
utilizing the three different biometrics to develop different
models discussed in the Methods section, i.e., Section II-E,
we consider the same 612 instances from each biometric.
2) Audio Data Augmentation: Breathing audio could be al-
tered due to a change in contexts, e.g., environments, physical
state, or mood. To simulate this and capture the variations,
we augment the original audio breathing events using various
pitch shifts and speed changes.
• Pitch shift: We consider 15 different pitch shifts ranging
from -3.5 to 3.5 with 0.5 increments
• Speed change: We consider seven speed changes ranging
from .25x to 2x times the speed of an original clip with an
increment of .25x, skipping 1x since that would represent
the original clip, which we have already included as a
pitch shift with value 0.
• Noise Superposition: We consider 10 randomly picked
vacuum and washing machine sound clips, obtained from
the environmental sound classification dataset [40], as
background noises to modify original breathing event
clips with eight different signal-to-noise ratio levels rang-
ing from 10−4 to 104, incremented by magnitudes of 10
while skipping 1.
Thereby, each original breathing clip is modified 102 times.
C. Feature Computation
We compute the following sets of candidate features.
• Heart rate features: From the windows of 10 samples we
compute 21 statistical features described in our previous
work [24].
• Gait features: We compute the same above mentioned 21
features from each window of x-, y-, and z-axis readings
obtained from both gyroscope and accelerometer.
• Audio features: From each inhalation breathing event
(original and augmented), we compute 40 Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCCs).
Thereby, we obtain 21 and 126 (21 from each of the six axes)
features from a single window of heart rate and gait data,
respectively, and 40 features from every breathing clip.
D. Feature Selection
To select the most influential features, we use the Sci-kit
learn feature selection package “Select the K Best Features”
(SelectKBest), which provides an importance score for each
feature and based on that score we rank the features. We try
with different numbers of features, i.e., K, to find the best
model performance. In this work, we find K = 20 performs
the best. In each iteration of the leave-one-out validation,
described in Section III-A, we select different feature sets,
which are very similar with changes in ordering.
E. Methods
In Figure 1, we present an overview of our proposed implicit
and continuous wearable-user authentication scheme using
person-dependent multiple biometrics that are readily available
on most of the wearables in the market. Depending on a user’s
context, i.e., user’s state, various routes of the authentication
scheme will be executed.
We first try to authenticate a user based on the heart
rate obtained from the photo-plethysmogram (PPG) sensors
since this biometric data is always available irrespective of a
user’s state. However, the heart rate data may not be precised
to identify the user when it is recorded in coarse-grained,
e.g., one samples per minute. Additionally, the heart rate
biometric can be easily affected by different factors, such
as motion artifacts or stress. Therefore, if the system cannot
authenticate the user with enough confidence, it checks the
next authentication module that relies on other biometrics.
The authentication system first tries to check whether the
user is moving utilizing the on-device accelerometer and
gyroscope data. If the user is moving, the system tries to
authenticate the user based on gait and heart rate biometrics
together. If the system can authenticate the user with enough
confidence, it allows the user to access the device.
However, if the user does not move or the gait and heart
rate-based module cannot authenticate the user, the system
tries to combine breathing biometrics collected from the on-
device microphone. During sedentary states, audio recordings
from wearables are less affected by motion artifacts. Thereby,
the breathing audio recordings could be a good biometric to
identify users, while during sedentary states. If the system can
authenticate the user with enough confidence, it allows the user
to access the device. Otherwise, the user’s access to the device
is revoked and require some sort of external verification, such
as pin locks or passwords.
Based on the combination of the three biometrics that we
use in our authentication approach, we define the following
models:
• Heart rate data-driven model (HR model)
• Heart rate and gait data-driven model (HRG model)
• Heart rate and breathing data-driven model (HRB model)
While developing the above models, we consider various
classifiers, including the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN), random
forest (RF), naive bayes (NB), and support vector machine
(SVM) with binary and unary schemes. Compared to binary,
unary models are available only for the SVM classifiers with
radial basis function (RBF) kernels.
Based on the windowing approach discussed in Sec-
tion II-B1, we can derive the time complexity of our authen-
tication system based on the sampling frequency of different
sensors. For example, let us consider a case where every heart
rate sample is collected in x seconds. With this sampling
frequency, it will take 10x seconds to make a window of 10
heart rate samples. Therefore, if the HR model can success-
Fig. 1: Proposed wearable device user authentication scheme
TABLE I: The best HR models with average and standard deviation of performance measures
BINARY Model
Classifier (parameters) feature count ACC RMSE FAR FRR F1 score AUC-ROC
RF (n estimators = 450) 20 0.64 (0.12) 0.04 (0.01) 0.30 (0.15) 0.42 (0.16) 0.61 (0.14) 0.64 (0.12)
k-NN (k = 32, minkowski distance) 20 0.63 (0.11) 0.04 (0.01) 0.37 (0.15) 0.36 (0.14) 0.63 (0.12) 0.63 (0.11)
NB 20 0.65 (0.11) 0.04 (0.01) 0.36 (0.25) 0.39 (0.19) 0.61 (0.12) 0.63 (0.11)
SVM (RBF kernel,γ = 0.03, C = 3) 20 0.66 (0.11) 0.04 (0.01) 0.29 (0.16) 0.38 (0.17) 0.63 (0.14) 0.66 (0.11)
SVM (Poly. kernel, d = 1, C = 1) 20 0.65 (0.12) 0.04 (0.01) 0.26 (0.20) 0.44 (0.23) 0.59 (0.18) 0.65 (0.12)
UNARY Model
SVM (RBF kernel, γ = 0.05, ν = 0.5) 20 0.56 (0.08) 0.05 (0.00) 0.41 (0.14) 0.46 (0.09) 0.55 (0.08) N/A
TABLE II: The best HRG models with average and standard deviation of performance measures
BINARY Model
Classifier (parameters) feature count ACC RMSE FAR FRR F1 score AUC-ROC
RF (n estimators = 450) 20 0.69 (0.13) 0.04 (0.01) 0.47 (0.32) 0.15 (0.21) 0.73 (0.21) 0.71 (0.13)
k-NN (k = 24, minkowski distance) 20 0.79 (0.07) 0.03 (0.01) 0.19 (0.10) 0.23 (0.09) 0.79 (0.08) 0.79 (0.07)
NB 20 0.65 (0.10) 0.04 (0.01) 0.28 (0.26) 0.42 (0.27) 0.62 (0.20) 0.66 (0.10)
SVM (RBF kernel,γ = 0.05, C = 5) 20 0.82 (0.08) 0.03 (0.01) 0.17 (0.09) 0.19 (0.10) 0.81 (0.08) 0.82 (0.08)
SVM (Poly. kernel, d = 3, C = 14) 20 0.78 (0.09) 0.03 (0.01) 0.19 (0.12) 0.25 (0.13) 0.77 (0.10) 0.78 (0.09)
UNARY Model
SVM (RBF kernel, γ = 0.05, ν = 0.5) 20 0.72 (0.10) 0.04 (0.01) 0.28 (0.16) 0.29 (0.08) 0.72 (0.09) N/A
TABLE III: The best HRB models with average and standard deviation of performance measures
BINARY Model
Classifier (parameters) feature count ACC RMSE FAR FRR F1 score AUC-ROC
RF (n estimators = 600) 20 0.90 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) 0.13 (0.10) 0.07 (0.08) 0.90 (0.07) 0.90 (0.07)
k-NN (k = 2, minkowski distance) 20 0.92 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.11) 0.91 (0.09) 0.92 (0.07)
NB 20 0.75 (0.05) 0.04 (0.00) 0.22 (0.10) 0.29 (0.12) 0.73 (0.07) 0.75 (0.05)
SVM (RBF kernel,γ = 0.08, C = 4) 20 0.94 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) 0.06 (0.07) 0.07 (0.09) 0.93 (0.08) 0.94 (0.07)
SVM (Poly. kernel, d = 4, C = 16) 20 0.91 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) 0.06 (0.06) 0.11 (0.08) 0.91 (0.07) 0.91 (0.07)
UNARY Model
SVM (RBF kernel, γ = 0.05, ν = 0.5) 20 0.72 (0.07) 0.04 (0.00) 0.32 (0.10) 0.24 (0.06) 0.73 (0.06) N/A
fully validate a user, it will take 10x seconds to complete the
authentication process. However, if the HR models to validate
a user, the system can take one of the two paths based on the
user’s context. If the user is in a non-sedentary state, then the
HRG model will be triggered, which will wait for an additional
10x seconds to collect 10 gait and heart rate samples; thereby,
a total of 20x seconds will be required for the system to
validate the user. If the HR model fails to validate the user
and the user’s context, i.e., physical state is sedentary, then
the system will try to authenticate the user based on breathing
events in addition to heart rate. Since the average length of a
breathing events used in this work is 1.4 seconds; therefore, if
x >= 0.14 seconds (i.e., a single heart rate window is longer
than the breathing event), the system will need 10x seconds
to gather 10 new heart rate samples for the HRB model to
test the user. Thereby, it will take in total 20x seconds for the
system to authenticate the user. However, if x < 0.14 seconds,
i.e., breathing events are larger than the heart rate windows,
the system will take 10x+ 1.4 seconds to validate the user.
III. USER AUTHENTICATION
Before presenting the detailed evaluation of our models,
we first present training-testing set split and our modeling
schemes, followed by list of performance measures and hyper-
parameter optimization.
A. Training-Testing Set
In our binary modeling, we try to distinguish a valid user
(class-0) from the impostors (class-1). To avoid overfitting,
we consider at least 10 times more feature windows, i.e.,
number of instances than the number of features. While
training-testing, we follow the leave-one-out strategy, where
we train-test N unique models one-by-one for each user
with N number of instances. During each training-testing,
we keep one instance for testing and use the rest of the
N − 1 instances for training. Since we have 10 subjects and
perform 10 leave-one-out testing for each subject; thereby, all
aggregated performance measures presented in this paper are
based on 60 performance measures.
For class balancing, in case of binary models, we consider
the same N − 1 number of instances from each class. Since
our imposter class (class-1) consists of nine person data (i.e.,
all subjects except the one considered as valid subject or
class-0), we pick (N − 1)/9 instances from each imposter.
For example, while training a HR model, we consider 510
heart rate windows from a target/valid user and 510/9 ≈ 56
windows from each of the nine imposters. In the test set,
we consider 102 windows from the valid user and 102/9 ≈
11 windows from each imposter. Similarly, while training
a HRB model, we use 510 windows, i.e., breathing events
from a valid user in addition to 510 heart rate windows.
Where, 510 breathing events are obtained from the five original
breathing events and their 102 augmented events, i.e., 5×102
= 510. To keep the training and test set separate, to use the
remaining one breathing event and its 102 augmented events,
i.e., 102 events/windows. For imposter, we uniformly select
the windows to ensure a balanced classification. In case of
unary models, we also follow the leave-one-out strategy. But,
compared to the binary, unary models are developed with only
a valid user’s data with an outlier rate (ν) to split the user’s
data into valid and outlier groups. In case of our experiments,
we find ν = 0.5 as the optional outlier rate.
B. Performance Measures
To evaluate the performance of different modeling
approaches, we consider the following measures:
Accuracy (ACC), which is the fraction of predictions that
are correct, i.e.,
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FN + FP + TN
(1)
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), which is the square root
of the sum of squares of the deviation from the prediction to
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2: Box plots of (a) positive and (b) negative measures
of performance of the HRB model with Binary SVM RBF
classifier. Cross markers (×) represent the average values.
the actual value. It is equivalent to the square root of the rate
of misclassification, i.e.,
RMSE =
√
FP + FN
TP + FN + FP + TN
(2)
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), which is the fraction of
invalid users accepted by an authentication system, i.e.:
FAR =
FP
FP + TN
(3)
False Rejection Rate (FRR), which is the fraction of
genuine users rejected by an authentication system, i.e.:
FRR =
FN
TP + FN
(4)
F1 Score, which is the measure of performance of an
authentication system based on both it precision (positive
predictive value) and recall (true positive rate) measures, i.e.:
F1Score = 2
(
TP
TP + FN
+
TP
TP + FP
)−1
(5)
Area Under the Curve - Receiver Operating Characteristic
(AUC-ROC), which is the graphical relationship between FAR
and FRR with the change of thresholds. Where terminologies
used in Equations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 have their usual meaning in
machine learning, when classifying a subject using a feature
set. Therefore, a desirable authentication system should have
lower negative measures (i.e., RMSE, FAR, and FRR), but
higher positive measures (i.e., ACC, F1 Score, and AUC-ROC)
of performance. We also use Equal Error Rate (EER), which
is defined as the point when FRR and FAR are equal, i.e., a
trade-off between the two error measures (i.e., FRR and FAR)
C. Hyper-Parameter Optimization
We use the grid search package in the Sci-kit learn to
find the optimal hyper-parameter sets. For each leave-one-
out modeling, we separately perform the hyper-parameter
optimization using various ranges of values. From the different
iterations of the leave-one-out approach, we obtain similar
values for the hyper-parameters. In Tables I, II, and III,
we present the set of optimal values obtained from different
modeling approaches.
D. Authentication Model Evaluation
In Tables I, II, and III, we present the performance of
the best models using various biometric combinations and
different classifiers. In Table I, we observe that the best binary
HR model (i.e., model that only uses heart rate data) can
provide an average ACC and AUC-ROC of 0.66 ± 0.11. As
discussed previously in the Section II-E, if the HR model is not
confident enough to authenticate a user or fails to authenticate,
we use additional biometrics, such as, gait or breathing sound.
Compared to binary, for the unary HR model, we observe low
performance, i.e., an average ACC of 0.56±0.08 since Unary
model considers portions of a valid user’s data as outliers.
In Table II, we observe that adding gait biometric (when
available) with heart rate, all measures improve. In case of
the best binary HRG model (i.e., model that uses heart rate
and gait biometrics), ACC and AUC-ROC increased by 24%;
F1 score increased by 29% compared to the best binary HR
model. The FAR also improves (i.e., drops) from 0.29± 0.16
to 0.17 ± 0.09. Though gait data is only available while a
user is moving, its addition to less accurate minute-level heart
rate data can significantly improve authentication performance.
Similarly to binary, the unary HRG model shows promise over
the unary HR model with an overall increase of about 29%
both for ACC and F1 score.
In Table III, we observe that the HRB model (i.e., model
that uses heart rate and breathing biometrics) achieves a better
performance compared to the HRG model. We achieve a
65% drop in the FAR while comparing the binary HRB with
the binary HRG model. Additionally, we observe ≈ 15%
increase, while comparing the ACC, F1 score, and AUC-ROC
of the binary HRB model with the binary HRG model. While
comparing the HRB model to the HR model, we observe a
huge performance improvement. Compared to the binary HR
model, the binary HRB model performs better in terms of F1
score (an increase of 48%) and AUC-ROC (an increase of
42%) with a high accuracy of 0.94 ± 0.07. The unary HRB
model performs similar to the unary HRG model with a lower
standard deviation, i.e., higher consistency, in terms of ACC
(0.10 vs. 0.07) and F1 score (0.09 vs. 0.06).
In Figure 2, we present five summarized values of different
Fig. 3: PDF and CDF with error bars of binary HRB SVM
(RBF) model performance.
Fig. 4: Change of error rates with varying confidence thresh-
olds using the binary HRB SVM (RBF) model.
performance measures in addition to the average values
presented in Table III. In the figure, we observe that median
of each performance measure is better than average, since
average is easily affected by outliers, which we do not show
for the simplicity of visualization. For example, we obtain
2.6% better ACC, 2.8% better F1 score, 59% better FAR,
and 89% better FRR, while comparing median with average
values. Additionally, we observe that the interquartile ranges of
different performance measures are about 0.07 (Figure 2a) and
0.05 (Figure 2b). Similarly, in the case of unary modeling, we
obtain tighter interquartile ranges. These narrow interquartile
ranges represent the consistency of performance measures.
In Figure 3, we present the Probability Distribution Function
(PDF) and Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) with error
bars of performance of the best binary model. In Figure 3,
around 65% of the performance values (both ACC and F1
scores) fall in the range of 0.95–1, which shows that our
models perform very well for the most of the cases. In the
case of unary modeling, we observe that 23 (i.e., ≈ 66%)
of the values fall in the range of 0.7–0.8, which is also a
reasonable performance for unary model [24].
Additionally, in the figure, we observe that from the errors
bars are very short, i.e., achieved performance values are
highly consistent. Therefore, our developed models consis-
tently perform well.
E. Error Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis on how our system
performs with the change of confidence levels, i.e., thresholds.
In case of an ideal system, it is desired to have a lower FAR
and FRR. In Figures 4, we present our analysis of error rates
(FAR and FRR) with varying confidence thresholds for the
binary HRB SVM (RBF) model. We observe that at confidence
threshold 0.52 FAR and FRR intersects with an equal error
rate (EER) of about 0.06. After this point, error rates drop
quickly. We observe that FAR and FRR drops below 0.05 after
threshold values around 0.6 and 0.7, respectively.
IV. LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
attempts to authenticate a wearable device user without any
explicit user interaction utilizing three easily obtainable soft-
biometrics (i.e., heart rate, gait, and breathing sounds) in a
more context-based approach, i.e., availability of data. We can
authenticate a user with an average accuracy and AUC-ROC of
0.94±0.07, F1 score of 0.93±0.08, and an EER of about 0.06
FAR at 0.52 confidence threshold while considering the heart
rate and breathing sounds. This shows the promise to develop
a continuous implicit-authentication system for the market
wearables utilizing their limited sensing and computational
capabilities.
This work has some limitations, which we plan to address
in the future. First, we have limited number of audio breathing
clips. However, we increase the data volume using standard
audio augmentation approaches. Second, in this feasibility
work, we use a set of ten subjects. However, we perform a
leave-one-out validation approach and our achieved perfor-
mance shows a promise to further investigate this with a large-
scale extended period study. Third, we use different datasets,
which could affect the performance. However, we use three
independent biometrics and perform feature selection analysis
to optimize implementation; thereby, our results potentially
shows a baseline performance, which could further be im-
proved by using the three biometrics from the same subject
since that could more robustly identify a user compared to
our case. Finally, more advanced modeling techniques such
as deep learning models (recurrent neural networks or convo-
lutional neural networks) may further improve the accuracy
of the models, but that will require to off load data from the
wearable, which can lead to additional security challenges;
therefore, our approach has a higher scope to implement on
the wearables.
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